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AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE INTELLECTUAL
MIGRATION MEETS THE GREAT MIGRATION
DAVID THOMAS KONIG *
PRELUDE
Americanization of the Common Law, the first of many significant monographs
that William E. Nelson has produced in his career, redirected the writing of
American legal history by demonstrating the explanatory power of using a comprehensive archival database to pose, test, and advance hypotheses about legal
change. Nelson had been trained to appreciate such a methodology while a graduate student at Harvard University, where his mentor Bernard Bailyn had begun
his own academic career with studies that aggregated large amounts of data from
which to draw and test creative hypotheses about Early American social and economic change. In the work of both scholars we can see how a powerful “Intellectual Migration”—that of particular German social scientists who found welcome
in the United States in the 1930s—transformed scholarly writing about the
changes that overtook New England following the “Great Migration” of three
centuries earlier—that of the Puritan founders of New England. The methods of
aggregating legal usage that Nelson employed in Americanization, and then put
to use in Conflict and Dispute Resolution in Plymouth County, Massachusetts,
1725-1825, have survived and transcended the historiographical debates of the
1970s and transformed the writing of Early American legal history.

William E. Nelson’s Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760–1830 appeared in
1975 1 at the crest of a historiographical tidal wave. Three years earlier John
Murrin, reviewing several of the many local-history studies of colonial
New England, had observed that “[c]olonial New England has become,
perhaps, the most thoroughly studied segment of world history. The year
1970 alone,” he continued, “produced eleven important books about a region which grew from only thirty-three thousand people in 1660 to roughly

* Ph.D., Harvard University, 1973. Professor of History and Professor of Law, Washington University
in St. Louis. He is author of LAW AND SOCIETY IN PURITAN MASSACHUSETTS: ESSEX COUNTY, 16291692 (1975) and editor of THE PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS, 1686-1859: THE RECORDS OF THE
INFERIOR COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS OF THE PEACE (16 vols.,
1978-81). His most recent work is John Adams: Constitution Monger, in CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CLASSICS: PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT FROM FORTESCUE TO BENTHAM (D. J. Galligan
ed., forthcoming Nov. 2014).
1. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830 (1975).
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one million by 1790.” 2 Influenced by the social-science turn of historical
studies in the 1960s 3, and perhaps no less by the social disorders of that
decade, these monographs drew on a school of thought that had begun to
emerge in the social sciences a decade before. This concept—that of collapse of community—was not new, nor has it been confined to New England communities. As a basic unit of analysis, the town as the locus of
community collapse has dominated American social science.
Propelling and unifying this scholarly output was the premise that early New England communities had achieved a cultural purity and social
stability no longer within the reach of modern America. In adopting this
premise, historians were channeling a good old New England tradition: that
of “declension,” or a falling away from the presumably more pious and
committed Puritan forebears whose “Great Migration” 4 of the midseventeenth century colonized the region and founded the “City upon a
Hill” 5 that has become the mythic symbol of American national identity. 6
What gave it greater force than the old-time religion, or even the notion of
American exceptionalism built on it, was this premise’s intersection with
the ascendancy of a “modernization” model resting on the idea that the
homogeneous pre-modern “community” had collapsed into heterogeneous
modern “society.” Whether these early communities had found the source
of their stability in Puritan religious communalism, 7 the normative secular
2. John M. Murrin, Review Essay, 11 HIST. AND THEORY 226, 226 (1972).
3. The Journal of Social History appeared in 1967, followed by the Journal of Interdisciplinary
History in 1970 and Social Science History, which championed the use of quantitative methodology, in
1976. In its first issue, the editors of the Journal of Interdisciplinary History pointed to the appearance
of several important monographs in 1966. American scholarship was also profoundly influenced by the
social history of pre-modern Europe produced by the so-called “Annales” school in France (after its
journal, Annales d’histoire économique et social), and its turn toward a histoire des mentalities, or
collective attitudes. At the same time, a prolific group of historians in England coalesced around Peter
Laslett and E. A. Wrigley, forming the Cambridge Group for the Study of Population, which in 1968
began publishing Local Population Studies.
4. The most recent comprehensive account is VIRGINIA DEJOHN ANDERSON, NEW ENGLAND’S
GENERATION: THE GREAT MIGRATION AND THE FORMATION OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1991).
5. Aboard the “Arbella” on the voyage to establish the Massachusetts Bay colony in 1629, John
Winthrop took the allusion from the Sermon on the Mount, Matthew 5:14: “Ye are the light of the
world. A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid.” Sermon of John Winthrop, City upon a Hill (1630),
available at http://www.historytools.org/sources/winthrop-charity.pdf.
6. The “city upon a hill” as the legacy of a sense of mission has become a staple of American
political rhetoric, used by, among others, Presidents John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan. John F.
Kennedy, City upon a Hill, Address Before the General Court of Massachusetts (Jan. 9, 1961), available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3364; Ronald W. Reagan, Farewell Address to
the Nation (Jan. 11, 1989), available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3418.
7. Most influentially stated by Perry Miller in his essay, “Errand into the Wilderness,” in a
collection of that title. PERRY MILLER, Errand into the Wilderness, in ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS
1, 1-16 (1956) (based upon Miller’s May 16, 1952 speech at the John Carter Brown Library at Brown
University, Providence, RI).

2014]

AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW

919

authority of hierarchy and subordination, 8 the structural cohesion of family
life and repressive methods of child rearing, 9 the common labor of English
collective agricultural practices, 10 the affinity of interests within age cohorts, 11 or the patriarchalism of town elders, 12 historians followed their
colleagues in sociology by training their focus on the town. It was there
that these declensionist forces were most obvious, and town studies proliferated. Once again, as historian Thomas Bender commented in 1976, we
saw how Americans “wistfully recall or assume a past made up of smalltown communities.” 13
Cultural anthropologists were not surprised by the creation of this
“myth of community,” which demonstrated “the great cultural weight
borne by images of a harmonious small town, a face-to-face society,” 14 but
historians of Early America took to the model avidly, conflating cultural
ideal or sociological ideal type and historical reality. Community studies
became a staple of doctoral research in elite universities. In its most robustly constructed historiographical form, the resulting historical paradigm for
early New England presented one such town as a “Christian Utopian
Closed Corporate Community,”15 but other representatives of this new
school of interpretation conformed in large part.
Bender’s study of “the changing structure and meaning of community
in American history” identified as seminal the work of Harvard literary
historian Perry Miller, whose 1941 essay “Declension in a Bible Commonwealth,” 16 influenced a generation of students of colonial New England. Bender finds Miller’s theological model of declension crossing
disciplinary boundaries in the early social historical work of Bernard Bailyn, and then further advanced with “renewed expression in the work of
8. STEPHEN FOSTER, THEIR SOLITARY WAY: THE PURITAN SOCIAL ETHIC IN THE FIRST
CENTURY OF SETTLEMENT IN NEW ENGLAND (1971).
9. JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 100 (1970).
10. SUMNER CHILTON POWELL, PURITAN VILLAGE: THE FORMATION OF A PURITAN TOWN
(1963).
11. PHILIP J. GREVEN, JR., FOUR GENERATIONS: POPULATION, LAND, AND FAMILY IN COLONIAL
ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS 1–2 (1970).
12. EDWARD M. COOK, JR., THE FATHERS OF THE TOWNS: LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNITY
STRUCTURE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND (1976).
13. THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 6 (1978).
14. CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, BARBARA YNGVESSON & DAVID M. ENGEL, LAW AND COMMUNITY
IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS 11–12 (1994).
15. KENNETH A. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TOWN, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: DEDHAM,
MASSACHUSETTS, 1636–1736, at 16 (1970).
16. Perry Miller, Declension in a Bible Commonwealth, 50 PROC. OF THE AM. ANTIQUARIAN
SOC’Y 37, 37–94 (1941). The essay forms a central interpretive core of the second volume of Perry
Miller’s later magnum opus, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: FROM COLONY TO PROVINCE (1953). It was
republished in PERRY MILLER, NATURE’S NATION 14–49 (1967).
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some of Bailyn’s best students.” 17 Along with his Harvard mentor and colleague Oscar Handlin, Bailyn is said to “have played a central role in transforming Miller’s theological idea, rooted in history, into a sociological one
with a tendency to escape from history.” 18 As argued in the present essay,
the intellectual trajectory as depicted here is as superficial in its understanding of Miller’s work as it is of Bailyn’s, 19 but it is important to discuss if
we are to understand the scholarly discourse of the mid-1970s and the reception given to Nelson’s Americanization of the Common Law when it
appeared in 1975.
Like any paradigm, that of New England communitarianism could not
maintain its explanatory power when scholars invoked it to explain far
more than it could. Murrin’s review essay posed the most thought provoking and, as it turned out, the most important challenge to a paradigm that
had reached its breaking point. A brilliant review, it was crafted with skill
and erudition, and was supported by an unmatched breadth of sources in
both English and colonial American history. Its array of factual and interpretative insights provided what Thomas Kuhn had called the “incommensurables” that could end the ascendancy of any paradigm, no matter how
well entrenched.20 Written in a sprightly manner that pulled no punches, its
critique was so widely (and deservedly) accepted that it quickly became a
staple of graduate education and a widely cited standard for assessing the
field.
The community collapse paradigm also came in for withering criticism in Bender’s study. His primary target was the simplistic, uni-linear
notion of modernization, whose fons et origo he located in the work of the
German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. Tönnies, who had migrated from a
small German farming community to an urban and cosmopolitan milieu in
the latter part of the nineteenth century, had proposed two contrasting concepts for understanding social groupings—Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.
As summarized for a later American translation, “[i]t focuses on the universally endemic clash between small-scale, kinship and neighbourhood-

17. BENDER, supra note 13, at 52.
18. Id.
19. To recognize Bender’s misinterpretation of both, see the critical comments in Bernard Bailyn,
Book Review, 27 NEW ENG. Q. 112, 112–18 (1954) (reviewing PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND
MIND: FROM COLONY TO PROVINCE (1953)).
20. The extension of this paradigm stands as a classic illustration of the process described by
Thomas S. Kuhn in THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). On further reflection and in
response to critics, Kuhn re-evaluated these ideas in “Postscript—1969,” included in the expanded
edition, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 174–210 (2d ed. enlarged 1970).
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based ‘communities’ and large-scale competitive market societies.’”21 In
Tönnies’s words,
the theory of Gesellschaft takes as its starting point a group of people
who . . . live peacefully alongside one another, but in this case without being essentially united – indeed, on the contrary, they are here essentially detached. In
Gemeinschaft they stay together in spite of everything that separates them; in Gesellschaft they remain separate in spite of everything that unites them.” 22

Despite his long-term editorship of the American Journal of Sociology and his status as “the Altmeister or veteran among German sociologists,” 24 Tönnies’s book enjoyed a far greater vogue in Germany than in the
United States, appearing in eight German editions by 1935, the year when
Nazi pressure forced the loss of his academic position. Though American
sociologists had been referring to his book since the 1920s, Gemeinschaft
und Gesellschaft was not translated into English until 1940, as Fundamental Concepts in Sociology (without, notably, its German subtitle, “An Essay
on Communism and Socialism as Historical Social Systems”). 25
The fate of Tönnies’s book is an ironically sad commentary on the vicissitudes of scholarship in the twentieth century. Tönnies’s social democratic leanings and antifascism had cost him his professorship.
Nevertheless, in the hands of the fascists he so courageously opposed, his
ideas on German communal life became, in the words of Peter Gay, “ghastly caricatures” 26 of a premodern culture of “primitive bonds that overwhelming events and insidious forces had loosened or destroyed.”
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Gay writes, had great appeal in Weimar
Germany, where “[m]any of the youth leaders hailed an idealized, romanticized medieval Germany as a refuge from commercialism and fragmentation.” 27 Taken to support their “invidious contrast between the authentic,
organic harmony of community and the materialistic fragmentation of
business society,” the hijack of Tönnies’s ideas and the Nazi application of
the term in Volksgemeinschaft were a cruelly ironic rebuke to the scholars
23

21. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 1 (Jose Harris ed., Jose Harris &
Margaret Hollis trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1887).
22. Id. at 52.
23. For a fuller account, see Werner J. Cahnman, Toennies in America, 16 HIST. & THEORY 147
(1977) [hereinafter Cahnman, Toennies in America]; see also WERNER J. CAHNMAN, FERDINAND
TÖNNIES: A NEW EVALUATION (1973).
24. The term is used in Louis Wirth, The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies, 32 AM. J. SOC., 412,
415 (1926).
25. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF SOCIOLOGY (Charles P. Loomis trans.,
Am. Book Co. 1940) (1887). A later edition of Loomis’s translation was published in 1957 as Community and Society.
26. Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as In Insider, in THE INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION:
EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1930–1960 11, 50 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1969).
27. Id. at 55.
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then being turned out of academic positions in Germany, Austria, and
elsewhere on the Continent, forced to flee to North America as an “Intellectual Migration” three hundred years after the Great Migration of the Puritans. 28
In the United States, shorn of its Marxist subtitle, finally translated into English and retitled, Community and Society found a growing receptive
audience of scholars, especially among a new generation of historians who
came of age in the 1960s and 1970s, for whom its evocation of a harmonious, precapitalist world of villages had great appeal. 29 Tönnies’s work,
however, was only one element of the profound impact of social science
brought to America by German-speaking exiles—what Bernard Bailyn has
described as a “vast Exilliteratur.” 30 These scholars recognized an American intellectual culture receptive to their ideas, and they brought with them
a desire to “diffuse their influence through American culture at large.”31 So
fully was their scholarship in the social sciences absorbed into American
universities that its influence needed no express citation. Many students,
like William E. Nelson, studied with Bernard Bailyn at Harvard and were
probably not fully aware of this influence in the many seminar and colloquium sessions that pushed them to engage masses of archival material,
clarify the significance of their research findings, and apply them to the
larger questions of the age. There, they faced the deceptively simple (and
now notorious) Bailyn question, “So what?” 32
“So what?” was fraught with meaning. Bailyn’s father-in-law, the
great sociologist and Austrian emigré Paul F. Lazarsfeld, was regarded by
many as the founder of modern empirical sociology. Lazarsfeld, who
moved permanently to the United States from Vienna in 1935 after losing
his teaching position and seeing his relatives arrested, is best known for his
28. Id. at 56–57. Gay makes explicit the comparison of the two migrations. Id. at 11–12. On
Volksgemeinschaft, see John Samples, Ferdinand Toennies: Dark Times for a Liberal Intellectual, 24
SOC’Y 67, 67 (1987).
29. See generally Rudolf Heberle, The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies, 2 AM. SOC. REV. 9
(1937); Cahnman, Toennies in America, supra note 23. Heberle was Tönnies’s son-in-law.
30. Bernard Bailyn, From Protestant Peasants to Jewish Intellectuals: The Germans in the
Peopling of America, 1 GERMAN HIST. INST.–Wash. Ann. Lecture Series 1, 9 (1988) (address to the
opening ceremony of the German Historical Institute).
31. Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn, Introduction to THE INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION: EUROPE
AND AMERICA, 1930–1960 1, 5–6 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1969).
32. This interrogation is fondly recalled by many of his former graduate students. See, e.g.,
Michael Kammen and Stanley N. Katz, Bernard Bailyn, Historian and Teacher: An Appreciation, in
THE TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY. SOCIETY, AUTHORITY, AND IDEOLOGY 13
(James A. Henretta, Michael Kammen & Stanley N. Katz, eds., 1991); Jack N. Rakove, “‘How Else
Could it End?’ Bernard Bailyn and the Problem of Authority in Early America” in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY. SOCIETY, AUTHORITY, AND IDEOLOGY, supra note
32, at 274 n.3 (quoting Bailyn: “All this is very interesting . . . . But . . . so what?”).

2014]

AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW

923

work on how the mass media influence the way people make decisions.
Lazarsfeld also continued his work on communities, 33 and Bailyn had a
profound understanding of the subject as interpreted by sociologists on
both sides of the Atlantic. Few students were aware of Bailyn’s deep immersion in social theory, or of the influence of his friend Robert K. Merton
that added to it, for he eschewed social science jargon and preferred to use
historical examples to make his point. 34 Two of those students remark,
Reading through the corpus of Bailyn’s major work, one might not readily guess
that he is deeply conversant with the social sciences and even with the natural
sciences as modes of scholarly inquiry and enterprise. It is rare, indeed, to encounter in Bailyn’s prose a phrase like “functional integration,” and rarer still to
find in his footnotes any citations at all to works by sociologists, social psychologists, anthropologists, or political scientists. 35

Like Tönnies, Lazarsfeld was part of the revolution in social theory
that convinced American sociologists that their German-speaking counterparts had abandoned their “philosophical and speculative” interests. 36 In
their place they developed what once was known as “sociography.” Lazarsfeld admitted, “I was not familiar with various papers by Tönnies in which
he tried to introduce the idea of sociography into the tradition of German
sociologists,” 37 but he did more to advance it in the United States than anyone else, at first renaming it “empirical social research” before settling on
“survey analysis.” The older term, he explained, had come “to connote a
mechanical description instead of a systematic analysis of concrete data
which it originally meant.” 38 In the process, he brought to it a quantitative
methodology that gave it a “more concrete” basis, acknowledging and
building on Tönnies’s “sociography.” 39
Tönnies has been aptly described as a “utopian visionary,” 40 and his
contrast of “community and society” meshed nicely with scholarly critiques
33. See, e.g., ELIHU KATZ & PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE: THE PART PLAYED
BY PEOPLE IN THE FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1955). Soon after his arrival in the United States,
Lazarsfeld sought out Robert Lynd, whose MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1929) had
become widely influential.
34. For Lazarsfeld’s influence on Merton’s work, and the influence of both on Bailyn, see
ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (Free Press of Glencoe ed., rev. and
enlarged ed. 1964) (1949) [hereinafter MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY]. Bailyn is the recipient of a booklength “Dear Bud” letter that was the inspiration for Merton’s most famous and accessible book, ON
THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965).
35. Kammen and Katz, supra note 32, at 8.
36. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, An Episode in the History of Social Research: A Memoir, in THE
INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION: EUROPE AND AMERICA 1930–1960, supra note 31, at 270.
37. Id. at 283.
38. PAUL F. LAZARSFELD, MAIN TRENDS IN SOCIOLOGY 12 (1973).
39. Lazarsfeld, supra note 36, at 270-71.
40. Cristopher Adair-Toteff, Ferdinand Tönnies: Utopian Visionary, 13 SOC. THEORY 58, 58
(1995).
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of American society in the 1960s and 1970s. What these studies found in
Tönnies’s work, however, was not exactly what he had intended. Werner
Cahnman, imprisoned in a concentration camp before emigrating to the
United States, had had a first-hand view of the misuse of social science in
Germany, and he was sensitive to the way that Tönnies’s ideas had been
embraced on American campuses: by 1977, he wrote, its attractive postulation of “dichotomies,” “ideal constructs,” and “polar types” had spread into
college textbooks and learned journals, where its basic premise was “more
often ritualistically invoked than actually known.” 41 The same may be said
of a classic work that Tönnies admired: Henry Sumner Maine’s widely
cited Ancient Law, whose basic premise was the oft-quoted statement that
“the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement
from Status to Contract.” 42 Like Gemeinschaft und Geselleschaft, Maine’s
status-to-contract paradigm contrasting law in the village community and in
the modern city led to facile misappropriation by later scholars.
In his graduate seminar at Harvard, Bailyn offered informed, cautionary, and suggestive critiques of social science methodology. For this reason
alone, classifying scholars such as Bailyn, as Bender did, among the wayward disciples of Tönnies or, for that matter, of Miller, is misplaced.
Though he did not always identify Tönnies by name, Bailyn warned his
students that such concepts as Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, as uni-linear
and mutually opposed ideal types, had been overextended and oversimplified, much in the process that Thomas Kuhn described for scientific paradigms collapsing on themselves by bearing the sheer weight of too much
interpretative work on too many subjects. Graduate students in Bailyn’s
seminar were cautioned, as he recalled to an early student of his, that the
historian’s facile borrowings of other disciplines were “rigged to accomplish some meta-purpose.” 43
An astute student of twentieth-century social science, Bailyn agreed
with the many sociologists who warned that the Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft paradigm could produce “sterile philosophizing if they are to be used
as the perennial frames into which the many-sided, complex, and elusive
facts of reality are to be squeezed.” 44 As Werner Cahnman wrote, Tönnies’s first American followers “fixed many a mistaken image in the minds
of those who relied on their statements. Innumerable textbook writers,” he
41. Cahnman, Toennies in America, supra note 23, at 164.
42. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 100 (1917); see also HENRY SUMNER MAINE, Oxford
Lectures, in VILLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND WEST (1872).
43. Letter to Michael Kammen (Sept. 1, 1979) (cited by Kammen in Kammen & Katz, supra note
32).
44. Louis Wirth, The Sociology of Ferdinand Toennies, 32 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 412, 422 (1926).
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remarks, “have copied comments on Toennies from each other . . . .” 45
Tönnies’s Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft had imposed a Procrustean bed
on the study of the social history of Early America, much as Miller’s “Declension in a Bible Commonwealth” had done for intellectual history or
Maine’s Ancient Law had done for legal history. 46 All three works—or,
rather, their misuse by later admirers—had blinded scholars to a deeper
understanding of the rich texture of social relationships.
Bailyn’s caution was well taken, if not by all his students, but by most
of them, Nelson included. His critique reflected not only his own misgivings but also those of other historians and historically-inclined social scientists of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1966 one of these historically-inclined
sociologists, Kai Erikson (a Vienna-born emigré son of the German psychoanalyst-sociologist Erik Erikson), also cast doubt on the idea that a
community had to be a geographically defined area such as the town. In his
Wayward Puritans, 47 Erikson applied “community” by the way it defined
deviant behavior—by “the relationship between a community’s boundaries
and the kinds of deviance experienced.” Deviance was itself “normal,” in
that it defined the boundaries of those norms by which a group of people
sought to make real its shared understandings or obligations. 48 Rather than
demonstrating a fracturing of a community—because friction, conflict, and
deviance were never absent in any society—he did not limit himself to the
town as the definition of community. The terms “community” and “town”
were conceptually too limiting; a community might or might not be coterminous with a town’s spatial boundaries, but as a sociologist his argument
about deviance “should fit all kinds of human collectivity.” 49 He used
“community,” he explained, “because it seems particularly convenient.”50
Community emerged, as it were, from the definition and punishment of
deviance. Erikson had noted, among other things, that in the time and place
he studied, “the offender rate seems to have remained quite stable.” 51
But this was only prelude to his fundamental question: What did this
empirical data mean? What did it have to do with the larger questions that
historians and sociologist were asking? Or, to phrase it differently, “So
45. Cahnman, Toennies in America, supra note 23, at 154.
46. See, e.g., the critique by J. Russell VerSteeg, From Status to Contract: A Contextual Analysis
of Maine’s Famous Dictum, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 669 (1989).
47. KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (Jennifer
Jacobson ed. 2005).
48. Id. at 19.
49. Id. at 8–10.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 181 (Erikson studied Massachusetts Bay in the seventeenth century, and used Essex
County to quantify data on crime rates).
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what?” This is not the place to examine all of Erikson’s conclusions flowing from this insight, but we should acknowledge the caveat he had made
clear in his preface, and which shared Nelson’s purpose and method in
Americanization of the Common Law: “[T]he data presented here have not
been gathered in order to throw new light on the Puritan community in
New England but to add to something to our understanding of deviant behavior in general.” 52 His goal was a limited one, constrained within the
limits of what it could explain, but also by what it must explain.
Completing his doctoral dissertation at Harvard under Bailyn, Nelson
listed his mentor first in acknowledging scholars in the book’s preface.
Bailyn deserved pride of place for substantive and alphabetical reasons.
Not only did his seminar introduce his students to the history and historiography of the colonial era, but it subtly introduced students such as Nelson,
whose training had been in law, to approach archives with the eye of a
social scientist. Lazarsfeld’s impact—the combination of the quantitative
and the qualitative—was clear, but more important yet was that of Lazarsfeld’s colleague and collaborator, Bailyn’s friend Robert K. Merton. This
distinguished Columbia University sociologist acknowledged his own intellectual debt in 1957, “In recent years . . . I have learned most from Paul F.
Lazarsfeld” and “it is evident from our countless conversations that he has
no conception of the full extent of my intellectual debt to him . . . .” 53 The
social science of the Harvard seminar echoed Merton’s work, and Bailyn’s
advice that his students avoid grand theoretical models and instead seek
“mid-level” hypotheses called to mind Merton’s description of his own
work:
I attempt to focus attention on what might be called theories of the middle range:
theories intermediate to the minor working hypotheses evolved in abundance
during the day-by-day routines of research, and the all-inclusive speculations
comprising a master conceptual scheme from which it is hoped to derive a very
large number of empirically observed uniformities of social behavior. 54

Nelson, a law school graduate and former Supreme Court clerk,
sought to understand why the legal system functioned as it did. His methodology of amassing as close to a comprehensive database of legal activity
as possible addressed the concerns of a legal scholar more than those of a
social historian. To paraphrase Erikson, he sought not to throw new light
on the Puritan community, but rather to add something to our understanding of legal behavior in general. Nelson also was examining the New England community, but from a different starting and focal point than that of
52.
53.
54.

Id. at viii.
MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 34, at x.
Id. at 5–6.
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religion, economics, family, or demography: Nelson’s focus was the legal
system. Bailyn’s monitory influence about social science methodology—no
matter how implicit or oblique—becomes clear on a close reading of Nelson’s book and with an awareness of the legal-historical community within
whose debates and traditions Nelson was writing. Reviewing the book for
the Columbia Law Review, legal historian Herbert A. Johnson ranked it
with other “exceptional first books that with the passage of time may become a classic of historical literature.” 55
Over the course of forty years, I am convinced, Johnson’s prediction
has been fulfilled. Others at the time, however, were not as positive about
its prospects. Nelson may have set himself up for trouble with the critics of
the modernization paradigm by announcing in his preface that he was offering a “limited attempt” to “trace the emergence of modern American law
from its colonial antecedents during the half century following the American Revolution.” 56 However, the important word in Nelson’s confession
was not “modern”; it was “limited.” Aware of the overreach characterizing
the community studies appearing as he wrote, he was only asking his research method to prove what it could explain. Like Merton’s “middle
range” inquiry or Erikson’s circumscribed project to “add to something to
our understanding of deviant behavior in general,” Nelson examined the
subsection of legal activity within a society to generate an explanatory
theory of that feature of human behavior while remaining sufficiently
grounded to enable empirical testing.
Even so, and not surprisingly, many reviewers of Americanization
read it within the prevailing—albeit crumbling—paradigm of modernization in historical discourse: the social stability/community collapse paradigm. Lumping Americanization with them, they assigned to it the same
flaws that they were rightly exposing in the earlier community studies, and
of which scholars such as Nelson, less dazzled by the attractive simplicities
of popularized versions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, were aware:
making the two categories “empirically exclusive categories rather than
ever-present dichotomic elements in a society.” 57 To be sure, reviewers
readily recognized the virtues of Nelson’s legal scholarship—virtues that
endure, and are worthy of our attention before we proceed to re-examine
the criticisms of his historical scholarship and return to take a closer look at
Nelson’s version of colonial New England stability. Nelson’s debt to what
55. Herbert A. Johnson, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 713, 713–719 (1976) (reviewing WILLIAM E.
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830 (1975)).
56. NELSON, supra note 1, at 149.
57. Cahnman, Toennies in America, supra note 23, at 149.
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he had learned in graduate school was obvious, if unspoken, in his unprecedented accumulation of an empirical universe of legal activity in the period he studied. Nelson had made an exhaustive examination of “not only all
published statutory and judicial material for Massachusetts between 1760
and 1830 but also all available manuscript material, including unpublished
judicial opinions, lawyers’ notes, and, most commonly, records of pleadings, judgments, and other papers incorporated into official court files.” 58
Typical of the many reviewers impressed with such diligence,59 Jamal
Zainaldin praised Nelson’s engagement with the law:
Nelson places private law squarely in its societal context. In many ways, this
book is a remarkable achievement. The breadth of analysis, the legal expertise,
the imaginative employment of sources, and the novel interpretations of legal development are indeed impressive. 60

At the same time, however, he offered a reservation shared by others:
that Nelson had written two books: “While Nelson’s grasp of the historical
common law process is unparalleled, in the end his flawed construction of
the historical context of both the colonial and post-revolutionary eras seriously jeopardizes the validity of his interpretation of legal change.” 61
Zainaldin divided his assessment of the book into two parts: one that “reviews in depth Nelson’s argument and briefly summarizes his contribution
to the field of legal history” and another that “examines the argument from
the perspective of recent American historiography.” By such a reading,
Nelson had expropriated the reigning paradigm of community collapse: He
had focused “solely on the rise and fall of ethical unity.” 62
To be sure, Nelson did use the language of the communalist paradigm
in describing colonial Massachusetts, against which he contrasted the postrevolutionary departure toward a more individualistic world of material
values. Unlike the post-revolutionary society that followed it, the colonial
era was not a forum for contending groups to compete for the material
gains of an economy unleashed from collective control and eagerly pursu58. NELSON, supra note 1, at vii.
59. Jamil S. Zainaldin, The New Legal History: A Review Essay, 73 NW. U.L. REV. 205, 206
(1978) (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830 (1975)) Use of Zainaldin’s review is not
intended to single it out for special criticism. It was intended to be even-handed and judicious, giving
credit where seen as due and offering criticism as seen where needed. Like the many other reviews of
the book, however, it simply misses what Nelson is really driving at); see also David H. Flaherty, 26 U.
TORONTO L.J. 108 (1976) (book review); Herman Belz, 82 AM. HIST. REV. 175 (1977) (book review).
60. Zainaldin, supra note 59, 206.
61. Id. at 214. Those who know Nelson and whose work has received his criticisms at the New
York University law school’s legal history workshops will find such a review ironically reminiscent of
Nelson’s frequent opening comment on scholarship presented at workshops: “What we have here are
two books.”
62. Id. at 206, 222.
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ing the benefits of autonomy both collectively and individually. He explained, “A society so divided cannot exist, I believe, when juries have
power to accept or reject whatever law they wish.” 63 And accept or reject
they did, but in the aggregate—in the vast database of cases Nelson assembled—they demonstrated a remarkable consistency. In its place after the
Revolution, there emerged a legal system in which the authority of juries
eroded. Now too inconsistent in their verdicts, they lost their power to control the outcomes of lawsuits. By a variety of procedural changes, which
Nelson described in clear, illuminating, and convincing detail, judges
gained authority, applying “rules that once had a stabilizing effect [but]
would now have precisely the opposite effect.” Such rules would have to be
replaced. As Nelson explains,
The transformation of the economy produced much legal change, the most important element of which was the emergence of legal doctrines that recognized
the materialism of the age and legitimated the idea of competition. 64

The “demise of the old ethical standards” 65 was followed by “a desire
for economic growth.” 66
Reviewers cited many examples, but Nelson’s presentation of a prevailing “consensus” before the Revolution will serve: “Consensus was
promoted by the fact that nearly all members of society shared common
ethical values and imposed those values on the occasional individual who
refused to abide by them voluntarily.” 67 Of the colonial courts that supported the stability of community life, Zainaldin could not comprehend “how
the legal system of prerevolutionary Massachusetts came to assume this
structure.” “Who is ‘the legal system’? Why does ‘it’ do such things to
‘itself?’ Nelson fails to offer answers to these questions.” 68 Zainaldin also
implausibly characterizes Nelson’s thesis of the post-revolutionary society
as “libertarian,” presenting a society of “rugged individualism.” 69
Criticisms along those lines miss the larger significance of Nelson’s
work, which becomes clear when we place it in the long context and tradition of writing legal history by other major figures whose insights have
transformed the field. Only then does the full import or purpose of Nelson’s
prodigious investigation of so much data make its weight felt in the central
themes of legal history. The ultimate crucial subject is the power of the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

NELSON, supra note 1, at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 4.
Zainaldin, supra note 59, at 208 n.9.
Id. at 210, 211.
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jury, demonstrated at length and with insightful detail about procedures and
pleading. Nelson produces an unassailably convincing portrait of the jury.
“It is difficult to comprehend how greatly the legal system of prerevolutionary Massachusetts differed from that of modern America,” he states,
with the “most important difference” being that pre-revolutionary juries
“possessed far greater power than juries do now.” 70 Nelson undertook to
explain not only how they wielded such power, but why. Understanding his
method and the intellectual foundations of his education in both law and
history, we can appreciate his historical achievement. Finding overwhelming evidence of jury authority, he asks—dare we say it?—”So what?” What
does such a phenomenon reveal about a society that could permit it? What
does such a phenomenon reveal about the arcana of pleading and evidence—nowhere before explained so astutely by scholars of New England’s legal past—that made it possible? The analytical purpose of this
question becomes clear by reference to Merton’s system of functional analysis: When a pattern of uniformity is perceived, it constitutes “an empirical
regularity which would become significant for theory only if it could be
derived from a set of other propositions . . . .” 71 Only a society in agreement on normative basics, Nelson showed in case after case, could produce
such a jury: “In a legal system in which juries have the power to find the
law, whatever disputes arise cannot be resolved by mere majoritarian fiat
but must be resolved by a process of consensus building that produces legal
rules acceptable to a broad base of society as a whole.” 72
Nelson’s conclusions rest on a firmer basis of legal and social science
scholarship than many reviewers realized, and the richness of his inquiry
into that intellectual world informs the way he went about his research. His
debt to Bailyn and to the social science of community is more obvious than
another equally profound debt, that to the long tradition of writing legal
history and to the recurring themes of legal-historical development. One of
these was the subject of an essay written in 1967 by the great S. F. C. Milsom on the relationship of “Law and Fact in Legal Development.” 73 Milsom focused on the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in which he
described a process of legal change analogous to that described by Nelson
in his presentation of the jury and its decision-making power over both law
and fact. The balance between law and fact as adjudicating authority, Milsom argues, is a central theme in the history of western law. In the emer70. NELSON, supra note 1, at 3.
71. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 34, at 96.
72. NELSON, supra note 1, at 4.
73. S. F. C. Milsom, Law and Fact in Legal Development, 17 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1967).
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gence of modern law—which is, after all, Nelson’s major goal—Milsom’s
“premiss is that legal development consists in the increasingly detailed
consideration of facts. If so, the limit at any time is the extent to which the
legal process presents the facts for legal handling.” 74 Milsom makes many
points about trial by ordeal, battle, and compurgation—procedures demanding explanation of how and why such apparently irrational practices
could have possibly commanded any legitimacy—in ways that critics of
Americanization would do well to heed. These procedures—like Nelson’s
prerevolutionary juries—could have functioned only in a society constituted along lines of shared acceptance of certain normative beliefs. Milsom,
like Nelson, asks a basic question: What is the logic behind the system?
What social-cultural conditions are necessary to create and give legitimacy
to the procedures and decisions that will follow? 75
The central argument of the first part of Americanization—and a
touchstone of comparison for the rest of it—is the jury and its ability to
hear the broad array of facts that a community would submit as bearing on
the merits of the case and on the law as the jury believed it ought to be.
Acting on those facts, the jury applied a notion of law of such force that it
effectively restrained the power of judges. 76 Americanization painstakingly
demonstrates the ways that the Massachusetts jury presented a system in
which pleading the general issue broadened the admissibility of facts, analogous to what Milsom describes for the thirteenth century. Like the ascendancy of the jury in Nelson’s Massachusetts, this was a “complicated
process, and one about which little modern work has been done,” namely
“the splitting of the general issue in existing actions by letting defendants
make special pleas.” 77
74.
75.

Id. at 1.
Nelson and Milsom ask essentially the same question as that posed by Keith Thomas in
RELIGION AND THE DECLINE OF MAGIC: STUDIES IN POPULAR BELIEFS IN SIXTEENTH- AND
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND:
This book began as an attempt to make sense of some of the systems of belief which were
current in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe but which no longer enjoy much recognition today. Astrology, witchcraft, magical healing, divination, ancient prophecies, ghosts
and fairies, are now all rightly disdained by intelligent persons. But they were taken seriously
by equally intelligent persons in the past, and it is the historian’s business to explain why this
was so.
KEITH THOMAS, RELIGION AND THE DECLINE OF MAGIC: STUDIES IN POPULAR BELIEFS IN SIXTEENTHAND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND ix (1971). I am indebted to R. B. Bernstein for reminding me
of this connection.
76. Summarizing the enduring interpretive significance of “this division of function in the AngloAmerican tradition[,] . . . known as the bifurcation of the trial court” is John H. Langbein. See John H.
Langbein, Bifurcation and the Bench: The Influence of the Jury on English Conceptions of the Judiciary, in JUDGES AND JUDGING IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW FROM ANTIQUITY
TO MODERN TIMES 67, 67-68 (Paul Brand & Joshua Getzler eds., 2012).
77. Milsom, supra note 73, at 15.
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The earlier procedural preference for the general issue in the eighteenth century, over pleading the narrower range of facts relevant to pleading specially, was what Milsom had found in the thirteenth-century plea
rolls. In the same manner demonstrated so amply by the Massachusetts
court records undergirding the arguments of Americanization, the earlier
English plea rolls show the system, as Milsom put it, “exploiting jury trial
to the full and allowing parties to put formally before the court whatever
facts seemed to them relevant.” 78 In prerevolutionary Massachusetts, the
stability and community agreement on normative matters of law supported
the same procedural accommodation: pleading the general issue.
So, too, the steady rejection of the general issue pleading in Milsom’s
fourteenth century paralleled that of Nelson’s nineteenth. In neither case
should we ask, “Who is ‘the legal system?” “Why does ‘it’ do such things
to ‘itself?” Rather, in explaining how lawyers effected the courtroom distinction between law and fact through the general issue, Milsom notes,
“Legal thinking has clearly outstripped legal forms,” and what is going on
does not appear in what the clerks record. “What matters to us is not that
this did happen . . . but that it could happen . . . .” 79 Nelson applies the
same deep insight to Massachusetts that Milsom applied to medieval England by noting how Massachusetts juries gained the upper hand in their
courtrooms when he goes beyond the descriptive to the analytical:
A more difficult question to answer is why officials tolerated restraints that prevented them from effectively governing the province. Why, in particular, did the
judges tolerate a legal system that left them much weaker than the judges of England, who had broad power to shape law by virtue of the fact that special pleas
were often interposed and that they could grant new trials when juries failed to
follow their instructions? 80

There is nothing inevitable or permanent about legal change, of
course, and the process of the erosion of jury power—largely seen in Nelson’s explanation of why pleading specially superseded that of the general
issue in post-revolutionary Massachusetts—is no exception. No longer
could society rest on the consistency of jury verdicts as it had in the years
before the Revolution. So, too, Milsom’s English juries once had heard
facts pleaded in the general issue; if a jury was likely to veer from justice,

78. Id.
79. Id. at 7.
80. NELSON, supra note 1, at 31. Richard B. Morris, a historian also trained in law, astutely
identified the significance of this line of questioning in his review of Americanization in 21 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 86, 86 (1977). Although he criticized Nelson for following too closely the analysis of
Michael Zuckerman’s Peaceable Kingdoms, he also praised Americanization for “the light it sheds
upon the transformation of American law and for the responses of legal institutions to the changing
economic ethos of a dynamic society.” Id. at 89, 90.
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only then might facts be pleaded specially. 81 Neither scholar, relied on
Maine’s simplistic formulation.
What Nelson had identified situated the anomalies within the grand
sweep of English and American legal history. Americanization had demonstrated what Milsom had found when he explained, “The unofficial nature
of much of the law produced by these mechanisms explains many
things.” 82 Of the difficulty of identifying the historical process, Milsom
advises, in words that Nelson’s work substantiates, “But though rules
which so operate will be tentative, hard for us to discover, and easy for
unconscientious litigants to evade, still they are real. And slowly they will
come into the open.” 83 The jury’s power so expanded in the eighteenth
century served as an agent of the community, a facilitator of the goals set
before it by those who recognized the impact that legal institutions had on
society. Readers might not appreciate the meaning of the book’s subtitle,
“The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society,” because Nelson
was not presenting the legal system as the driving force that used the formal powers of the state to transform society along the lines that those who
controlled the legal levers of power might wish. More careful readers will
note that Nelson describes that impact as one in which legal “rules of substantive law . . . sustained the building of consensus.” 84 Support for the
community’s normative goals was the impact, as “Law in a Changing Social Order” 85 was one agent of change, not its principal agent or cause. Law
reflected, and its rules implemented and mediated, the “demise of the old
ethical standards” 86 but they were not the cause of the change. When the
members of the jury no longer shared a common fund of ethical ideals,
their usefulness as mediators of conflict and agents of stability eroded.
CONCLUSION: A CODA
Americanization of the Common Law, like New England Merchants,
transformed the writing of Early American history by compiling and analyzing aggregated data to reveal patterns of behavior that lay behind the
more obvious events noted by contemporaries. Historians might speculate
or use their well-honed powers of inference to draw meaning from broad
trends of historical change, but Bailyn and Nelson applied “a systematic
81. Milsom, supra note 73, at 15.
82. Id. at 18.
83. Id. at 8.
84. NELSON, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 1–10 (title of Chapter 1).
86. Id. at 6.
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analysis of concrete data.” 87 In this way, Nelson could discern the “emergence” 88 of a new legal system from the “uncertainty and inconsistency” of
the old. 89 It was in “day-to-day” legal activity 90 of hundreds of cases that he
saw changes made “unthinkingly.” 91 Such changes were what one learns of
from Bailyn’s meticulously compiled shipping records, which reveal “latent events; and what is most striking about them is that contemporaries
may have been only partially aware of them, if at all.” 92
The purposefulness of their method is apparent in the coda that each
supplied to enhance and augment their initial efforts. Four years after he
published his New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, Bailyn
returned to a problem he had faced in writing that book. “Without realistic
notions of scale,” he wrote, “we cannot answer certain uniquely historical
questions of growth and decline and the phasing of change.” 93 This was an
empirical question, central to the tradition of scholarship brought to this
country by the emigré social scientists with whom he was so familiar, and
which would have such an impact on the writing of Early American history
at Harvard. One result of his curiosity was the collaboration with his wife,
Lazarsfeld’s daughter Lotte Bailyn, which led to publication of Massachusetts Shipping 1697–1714. A Statistical Study, 94 a volume tabulating and
analyzing the records of a register of the colony’s shipping in that period 95
(and a coda to New England Merchants). From this mass of detail—
collected on punch cards and laboriously loaded into the rudimentary computational devices of the time—they were able to extract conclusions about
the “broader implications of the statistics” drawn from the register.96 What
they discovered was a “broadening distribution of the ownership of shipping [that] developed together with an increase in the holdings of leading
entrepreneurs.” 97 The question, of course, was, “What did this mean?”
87. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
88. Nelson, supra note 1, at 3.
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Kammen & Katz, supra note 32, at 9.
93. BERNARD BAILYN & LOTTE BAILYN, MASSACHUSETTS SHIPPING 1697–1714: A STATISTICAL
STUDY, at v (1959).
94. Bailyn acknowledges that this project was possible “only in collaboration with Lotte Bailyn,
who, trained in a more rigorous discipline than history and skilled in machine methods of data processing, worked out a program by which the significant information of the Register, in all useful combinations, could be extracted mechanically and be made available for tabular presentation.” Id. at vi.
95. Id. at v-vi, 3-12 (explaining the register in detail). The register served the requirements of the
Act for Preventing Fraud and Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade, 1696, 7 & 8 Wm. III c. 22,
available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=46829.
96. BAILYN & BAILYN, supra note 93, at 74-75.
97. Id.
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They offered their findings as “a rich vein for historical speculation,” but
unmistakable was the foundation erected on “more permanent elements of
the American economy.” 98 They also reported how the registry contained
within it “not merely clear evidences of a forming economy, but also less
clear signs of an emerging social order.” 99 In the spirit of the Intellectual
Migration that brought empirical methods to the United States, they offered
their work as a means for other scholars to continue the advance of understanding one segment of early society in North America.
Six years after the appearance of Americanization of the Common
Law, Nelson published Dispute and Conflict Resolution in Plymouth County, Massachusetts, 1725-1825. 100 In one review, John Catanzariti called it
“essentially an extended footnote to his Americanization, paralleling it in
underlying themes but actually testing the assumptions of consensus on
which the earlier study was based.”101 Like the Bailyns’ study of shipping,
Dispute and Conflict Resolution was heavily tabular, with twenty-three
tables to the former’s thirty-three. Like Massachusetts Shipping it, too, was
presented in the spirit of encouraging others to do the empirical research
necessary to bring coherence to masses of data, from which both authors
hoped would emerge the broad patterns on which reliable social scientific
conclusions could be drawn. Within Nelson’s book, however, a note of
apologia crept in, perhaps prompted by some of the unsympathetic reviews
of Americanization. Nelson also had undertaken to promote the publication
of the entire corpus of records of the Plymouth County courts as another
resource for fruitful empirical research, and by 1981, the entire run of records from 1686 to 1859 had appeared in sixteen volumes. 102 It was this
body of data that Nelson used for Dispute and Conflict Resolution. Invoking the people of the Plymouth community whose lives left behind the records of their court activities, he reminded his readers that
they knew that, if a field is to produce crops, it is more important to plow and
sow it seasonably than to do so perfectly but too late. Like the farmers of Plymouth, I am quite aware that I have not plowed my field as exhaustively as it might

98.
99.
100.

Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
WILLIAM E. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY,
MASSACHUSETTS, 1725–1825 (1981).
101. John Catanzariti, Book Review, 1 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 419, 419 (1981) (reviewing WILLIAM
E. NELSON, DISPUTE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY, MASSACHUSETTS, 1725–
1825 (1981)).
102. PLYMOUTH COURT RECORDS 1686–1859: THE RECORDS OF THE INFERIOR COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS AND THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS OF THE PEACE (16 vols., David Thomas Konig
ed., 1978-81).
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be plowed. But I have plowed it seasonably and, I hope, well enough so that it
will lead to new and fruitful ideas. 103

Nelson’s earliest scholarship, represented by these two books, was truly “seasonable” in the sense meant by his subjects: apt as a corrective for
the intellectual spirit of its times, and weighty enough to announce the beginning of a new era in the writing of early American legal history.

103.

NELSON, supra note 100, at xi.

